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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a cognitive model of presence which emphasizes the interaction of top-down and bottom-up 
processes, and the subsequent creation of temporary representations of an environment in working memory. These 
temporary representations (which we term constructions) are formations of meaning about the environment, which allow a 
subject to make inferences and interact in that environment. We argue that this constructionist position follows from the 
existence of hypothesis selection models of presence such as proposed by Slater & Steed. Finally, we contrast our model to 
that of Wirth et al and discuss some of the implications of this model for presence in unfamiliar or unrealistic environments 
.1. Cognitive models of presence 
With the recent move towards a comprehensive theory of presence, cognitive science has surfaced as an important basis for 
understanding presence. For example [1], in discussing breaks in presence, propose a filtering, information-processing 
model in which one of two information streams (real environment/virtual environment) is selected for processing. Many 
other examples of the application of cognitive theory in presence exist - for instance [2] and [3]. Although it is generally 
accepted that presence is a complex, multi-factor construct, we believe that an understanding of the cognition of virtual 
environments (and indeed real environments) can lead to invaluable insights into fundamental aspects of presence. 
Therefore, although this paper presents an exclusively cognitive model of presence, it should be understood as an attempt to 
understand the role of cognition in presence, rather than an argument that a complete understanding of presence can come 
from examining cognition alone. 
2. Constructionism in cognition 
Constructionism involves the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes which create a mental construct reflecting 
some external or imagined situation in such a way that inferences and decisions can be made in relation to that situation [4] 
[5].  Furthermore, constructionism is generally associated with a dynamic state of cognition in which bottom-up processing 
activates particular top-down processes which in turn lead to a bias in bottom-up processing [6]. The ‘rabbit/duck’ 
switching illusion discussed in [1] is an example of two constructions arising from the same bottom-up data, but mediated 
by a different top-down bias. Constructions are capable of adapting to changes in the external world, but only to a degree; if 
the products of bottom-up processes lead to a significant mismatch with the construction, a reconstruction will occur so as 
to better represent the stimulus situation [7]. That constructionism is useful in presence research has already been argued by 
[8], and indeed, constructionism already exists in the literature in various forms. [9] for instance, argues for the interaction 
of internal and external factors as a determinant of presence. More recently, [10] describes a concept (perception and action 
in 3d space) in which a continual re-consideration of the environment in terms of the user’s cognition, perception and 
emotions occurs. Also, [11] proposes a model in which presence is an active process in which sensory and conceptual data 
are used to construct mental models of the environment (see section 7 below for a discussion of this model).  
3. The need for constructionism: The virtual stimuli problem 
In our view, constructionism is a useful tool in modeling presence because it solves an important problem in current 
thinking: namely, the problem of virtual stimuli. Often in the literature a distinction is made between stimuli which 
originate in the virtual environment, and stimuli which originate from other sources (for example, [1] and [12]). We find 
this distinction useful because it allows one to ask questions in terms of relevant information and distracters. However, this 
distinction is also somewhat problematic. From a physiological point of view, there is only one stream of input for a user of 
a virtual environment – all stimuli are real. All sound, regardless of its origin, is received by the same receptors in the ear. 
Similarly, all visual stimulation, regardless of its point of origin, is received by the same receptors in the retina. Once these 
receptors are stimulated, the original stimulus ends its role in perception; the receptors generate neural signals from which 
cognition proceeds. Therefore, once the stimulated receptors have fired their impulses, all information about the origin of 
the percept must be inferred via a series of cognitive processes - its position in space, its semantic relationship to other 
percepts, what object that stimulus represents, and where that stimulus originated.  
4. Cognitive constructions  
The ‘two streams’ of information between which a user selects [1] therefore exist not as external streams of information 
one of which is selected, but rather as two alternative interpretations or constructions of a complex set of perceptions. In 
one of these constructions (the ‘virtual construction’) the user interprets their mental state (the perceptions and the 
inferences drawn from these) as a coherent virtual environment. In the other construction (the ‘real construction’) the user 
will interpret their mental state as being in the experimental venue, viewing a display. In each case, information which 
matches the user’s basic idea (‘this is the virtual environment’) will be added to the construction, while information which 
does not match the construction will be attended out, or act as a distraction [11]. The construction thus becomes not only a 
basis of inference for perceptions, but also works to filter out irrelevant stimuli and bias perceptions to create a coherent 
model of the environment. In the constructionist view, there need not only be two possible constructions – depending on 
the mental state of the subject, any number of possible constructions are possible, many of which could be considered as 
evidence of presence. For example, placing the subject inside a cave system displaying the inside of a hospital could lead 
to, depending on the emotional or semantic aspects of the active construction, the experience of a  frightening hospital, a 
comforting hospital, a friendly VR laboratory or a stressful VR laboratory. It should be noted that the choice of which 
stimuli are used to form the construction depends not on the actual origin of the stimulus (the real or virtual environment), 
but rather on the current state of the construction, and the biases on attention and interpretation which it exerts. Thus, it is 
possible for stimuli arising outside the virtual environment (such as a phone ringing in the office next door) to be 
incorporated into the construction of the virtual environment. 
5. A constructionist cognitive model of presence 
We propose the constructionist cognitive model, which makes use of a basic information processing architecture (such as 
used by [13]). In this architecture (depicted in Figure 1), stimuli are selected for further processing by an attention filter. 
The selected inputs are then processed and transformed in working memory. These transformations are performed using 
rules and data contained in long-term memory. Thus, the contents of working memory are constructed by means of bottom-
up input (stimuli from the attention filter), as well as from top-down input (contained in knowledge structures and 
transformation rules) from long-term memory. The products of this processing in working memory represent temporary 
structures such as mental models, themes, cognitive maps and other constructs which allow the subject to make inferences 
about the world and thus interact with and navigate through it. 
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Figure 1: Information flow in the constructionist cognitive model 
The model represents a continual upward and downward flow of information and, by consequence, the continual 
construction and reconstruction of temporary structures in working memory. Information taken in by the senses is first 
partly processed by the attention filter, which itself contains a bias towards permitting or blocking certain types of 
information on the basis of relevance [14]. This information is then organized in working memory into temporary 
constructions such as semantic chunks or mental models [13]. The rules by which this organization occurs are encoded as 
activated knowledge structures (e.g. schemata or scripts) in long term memory [15]. These structures not only provide rules 
by which to organize information, but also fill in missing data with that learned in previous experiences [15]. As this 
occurs, the temporary structures in working memory are adapted to create a state which accommodates the perceptual 
information provided by the attention filter as well as the active structures in long-term memory. At the same time, the 
active structures in long term memory are affecting the attention filter by creating a bias towards filtering out unrelated 
information. 
5.1 Coherence, construction and re-construction 
Constructions are formed partly on the basis of previous experience and learning, and as such represent attempts to fit a 
current stimulus set into a meaningful whole (encoded by existing knowledge structures in long-term memory). In essence, 
forming a construction is a process of inferring meaning. Therefore, it follows that not every stimulus will be compatible 
with the construction that is active (for instance, a helicopter would not ordinarily be compatible with a construction of 
prehistoric Earth). Stimuli which are not able to fit into the construction are selected out by attention, which is biased (by 
the construction) to only allow in relevant stimuli - in this way, constructions are kept coherent. However, it is also possible 
for a stimulus, related or not, to demand attention to itself and thus force its way into consciousness [7]. This usually occurs 
in the case of stimuli which represent large, sudden differences between the outside world and the perceiver’s expectations. 
Thus a sudden noise or movement, an expected tug of a cable or similar stimulus will force its way into consciousness 
where, if a large disparity between the perception and active construction exists, will force a re-evaluation of the situation. 
When this occurs, a reconstruction takes place which incorporates the new stimuli. However, when this reconstruction 
occurs, the re-assignment of cognitive resources is felt – first as an odd sense of mismatch or confusion (as the construction 
fails to match the situation), and then as a subsiding of that sensation and with a sense of realization of the new situation as 
the reconstruction occurs [7]. 
5.2 Meaning activation & feedback 
In this model, the meaning which the subject constructs about the environment is crucial for their behaviour, and thus 
affects all levels of the model. Although meaning originates in the top-most level (knowledge structures in long term 
memory), it can flow downwards to working memory, as well as to the attention filter in the form of a bias for selection. 
The subject’s current construction also affects the temporary objects being formed in working memory. Thus, knowledge 
structures contribute to the construction of temporary structures in a ‘broad brush’ approach (due to the activation of 
categories, concepts, etc. [15]), although the specific details of the construction are determined by the stimuli. In this way, 
the meaning inferred by the subject will allow for interpretation and prediction of the state of the environment, while the 
perceptual stimuli allowed in by the attention filter will ensure successful behaviour which matches the true state of the 
environment. 
5.4 Presence in the model 
In this model, presence exists as the degree to which the construction is about the content of the virtual environment rather 
than about the display system or the experimental situation. This definition is in line with the concept of cognitive presence 
proposed by [3] as well as with the concept of ‘pretence’ proposed by Slater, in which presence is taken as when the subject 
is acting and thinking ‘as if’ in the virtual environment [17]. In order for this to occur, the construction will need to have a 
high degree of match to the stimuli (as would occur in a high-fidelity, highly immersive display); if not, the subject will 
experience a re-construction, which will disturb cognition about the virtual environment and thus reduce presence. 
Although the subject’s own biases and previous experience will contribute to their experience (which one might call the 
‘willing suspension of disbelief’) large disturbances in the stimuli will demand attention and are more likely to cause 
reconstructions (as occurs in a break in presence).   
6. Construction flexibility and unrealistic environments 
Although constructions tend to limit the information in consciousness to create a sense of coherence in the world, they do 
allow a great deal of flexibility in interpreting stimuli. A construction operates simply by means of creating expectations, 
and attempting to interpret meaning in terms of those expectations. In short, constructions operate on the level of concepts 
rather than specific objects. Thus, if we have constructed a restaurant from the available perceptions, then we will have an 
expectation for an interaction with a waiter at some point. We will also have general expectations about that waiter (he will 
take a food order, will display a particular degree of politeness and so on), but not specific expectations such as whether the 
waiter will be a man or woman, young or old, dressed in a particular way or not [15]. What exactly those expectations will 
be will depend on cultural conditioning and personal experience [4], but they will always be general enough to allow 
flexibility enough to allow successful interaction in the world. 
Because constructions rely so heavily on the expectations and data provided by top-down processes, an interesting question 
arises about constructions of unrealistic or highly unfamiliar environments. In such a situation, our model predicts that the 
closest fitting available knowledge will be activated, but due to the poor fit with bottom-up data, constant reconstructions 
will occur until enough information has been gathered to begin forming new top-level structures about the environment. 
Anti-presence [16] could be taken as an example of this process. Describing anti-presence [16] notes that people witnessing 
traumatic events often feel as if they were experiencing a film or other mediated environment rather than reality. We would 
argue that the closest fitting top-down knowledge people tend to have about traumatic events are all from films and other 
media, and thus it is these structures which become active during the constructions. Gradually however, with increased 
experience, top-level structures to deal with the new type of situation will form, which will allow more useful constructions 
to be formed. 
7. Cognitive constructions vs. spatial situation models 
Wirth at al [11] have proposed a model which emphasizes the subject’s construction of a mental model of the spatial 
situation. In this model, a spatial situation model (SSM), which encodes information about a physical space and the 
observer’s relation to it, is constructed from information presented by the encoding medium as well as from internal factors 
which include previous knowledge and context. In this model, the SSMs are formed and then tested against further input as 
the subject interacts with the world. The cognitive construction model we propose, although similar in its basic 
constructionist philosophy, is different from Wirth et al’s model in several important respects. Firstly, the model we 
propose differs in that we see constructions operating not only at the level of spatial or mental models of the environment, 
but rather at the higher level of meaning about the environment. Furthermore, we propose that the construction of meaning 
affects lower level cognitive processes (such as attention), which in turn affects the activation of higher level processes, 
thus making cognitive construction a highly interactive, continual process. Finally, we propose explicitly modeling the 
effect of the construction on attention, in line with findings from priming studies in attention (for example, [14]). Thus 
while this model is completely compatible with Wirth et al’s (in that spatial situational models can be seen as intermediate 
level constructed structures), we see construction as a far more fundamental process which involves all levels of cognition 
in an interactive way.  
8. Conclusion 
The constructionist cognitive model of presence is, we believe, an extremely useful tool not only for investigating the role 
of cognition in presence, but also for asking such questions as the importance of previous experience and thematic 
coherence as factors in presence. Although the model is only in its conceptual stages, we believe it is a useful framework 
for the theoretical development of the role of cognition in presence. 
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